U.S. Department of Education Releases Revisions to Final Title IX Regulations

On April 19, 2024, the U.S. Department of Education (Department) released its Final Rule under Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. These changes are effective August 1, 2024. Until then, school districts should continue to implement current district policies, and specifically policy(ies) and guidelines that took effect in August 2020 regarding Title IX obligations to eliminate sexual harassment in education program(s) and/or activities.

According to the Department, the final regulations are intended to help ensure that all people, including students and employees, receive appropriate support if they experience sex discrimination in schools and that schools’ procedures for investigating and resolving complaints of sex discrimination are accurate and fair to all involved. The Department stated that the final regulations strengthen several major provisions from the current regulations and provide schools with information to meet their Title IX obligations while providing appropriate discretion and flexibility to account for variations in school size, student populations, and administrative structures. The final regulations also change the definition of “sex-based harassment”; the scope of sex discrimination, including schools’ obligations not to discriminate based on sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity; and schools’ obligations to provide an educational environment free from discrimination on the basis of sex.

Stay tuned for additional updates and guidance regarding the new regulations. In the meantime, the unofficial version of the final regulations is available here. In addition, the Department has released a fact sheet and a summary of the major provisions of the final regulations.

U.S. Supreme Court Warns Public Officials Against Blocking on Social Media

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Lindke v. Freed, unanimously held that if a public official blocks someone from accessing the official’s social media page/account, this can constitute state action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, including for depriving a member of the public of his or her First Amendment rights, if the official both “(1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.” 

The application of this test will be fact-intensive, and the Court noted that “mixed use” social media accounts (i.e., an account that a public official uses for both personal and official posts) create the most opportunity for liability for a government entity.  It is likely that much of the litigation in these cases will be regarding whether the public official had authority to speak on the state’s behalf when the official is “speaking” on social media.  This will require a fact-specific review of the official (and his/her role) and the social media account itself, with the Court noting that “[t]he distinction between private conduct and state action turns on substance, not labels”.  The Court noted that a public official’s authority to speak can be established not only by “statute, ordinance, [or] regulation” but also by “custom or usage.” This is where the fact-specific analysis will have to be undertaken by the lower courts, with a review of the social media account itself and the history of the official’s use of the account for engaging in state action. 

If the public official has state authority to speak, the official also has to be attempting to exercise that authority when speaking on social media.  This is also a fact-specific analysis that lower courts are now tasked with undertaking.  Importantly, the Court indicated that, particularly for a mixed use (i.e., both private and public) social media account, the lower courts will need to analyze individual posts made by the public official to determine if any are state action.

The ultimate holding from the case is that, if any posts within a public official’s social media account are state action (as determined by the new two-prong test), the public official cannot block people from accessing the account.  If the official does block people, those individuals may have a cause of action against the government entity itself.

Although nuanced, this is an important change in the law that creates an increased potential for liability for school districts based on speech made by district officials on social media, including blocking citizens or deleting comments.  Districts and public officials are advised to review their social media accounts to ensure compliance in light of this change.

Gingo & Bair Law, LLC Welcomes Partner Emily Spivack

We are proud to announce that effective March 7, 2024, Emily Spivack joins the firm as our newest Partner. With nearly a decade of experience supporting public school districts, Emily shares our approach to providing specialized legal services with a promise to keep funds focused on education.

Prior to joining Gingo & Bair Law, Emily’s practice centered mainly on education law while working in the Labor & Employment group for Squire Patton Boggs.

Emily advises clients in a wide range of education law matters, including student discipline, contract and policy drafting, and employment questions. She regularly defends districts before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. She routinely serves as lead negotiator in bargaining with teachers, non-teaching school staff, and municipal employees. Emily also has extensive experience with public records and public meetings questions, both under the Ohio Sunshine Laws and the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Emily’s practice also includes advising on special education matters, including answering day-to-day questions, drafting IEP documents, responding to due process complaints and defending districts in federal court against claims brought by parents under federal and state special education laws.

Emily has experience litigating on behalf of schools and other employers in discrimination, harassment, retaliation and wrongful termination cases in state and federal court. She also frequently conducts investigations on behalf of employers into complaints brought by employees under internal harassment, discrimination and retaliation policies.

In addition, Emily is a frequent speaker at school law conferences and provides in-service training to administrators and staff members. She is a member of the Ohio School Board Association’s Ohio Council of School Board Attorneys, Ohio State Bar Association, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, and the D.C. Bar Association.

Adding Emily to the firm enhances our ability to broaden our scope of services while maintaining a customized approach to advocating for public school districts.  We are proud to work with Emily and look forward to expanding our vision of providing exceptional legal services in education.

HB 68 - SAFE Act and Save Women’s Sports Act - to Impact Ohio Schools

On January 24, 2024, the Ohio legislature voted to override Governor DeWine’s veto of House Bill 68 (“HB 68”), which addresses several issues regarding school districts and their obligations with respect to transgender students. The passage of HB 68 enacts the Saving Ohio Adolescents from Experimentation Act (“SAFE Act”) regarding gender transition services for minors, as well as the Save Women’s Sports Act, which will require school districts to designate separate single-sex teams and sports for each sex. Each of these provisions are set to go into effect on April 23, 2024.

SAFE Act

HB 68 prohibits “mental health professionals,” including school nurses and school psychologists from diagnosing or treating a minor for a gender-related condition without first obtaining consent from at least one of the minor’s parents, legal custodian, or guardian. The bill defines a “gender-related condition” as a condition in which a minor feels a difference between their gender identity and biological sex, which includes gender dysmorphia.

The bill also provides that if a minor is believed to be suffering from a gender-related condition, mental health professionals will be required to screen the minor for certain mental health conditions (i.e., depression, anxiety, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), autism, other mental health conditions), as well as physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse, during their course of treatment.

Any mental health professional who diagnoses or treats a minor in violation of the SAFE Act will be considered to have engaged in unprofessional conduct and will be subject to disciplinary action from their respective licensing board. Among other reasons, it is important that school districts understand these restrictions to ensure awareness among school nurses, counselors, and psychologists to avoid any potential disciplinary or licensure issues. Updates to forms, policies and/or procedures may be necessary.

Save Women’s Sports Act

HB 68 also enacts the Save Women’s Sports Act. The bill will require each school district to designate athletic teams based on the “sex” of participants. In doing so, each district will be required to have each of the following:

  1. Separate teams for participants of the female sex within female sports divisions;

  2. Separate teams for participants of the male sex within male sports divisions;

  3. If applicable, co-ed teams for participants of the female and male sexes within co-ed sports divisions.

The act defines “sex” as the biological indication of male and female sex hormones and genitalia that are present at birth, without regard to an individual’s psychologically chosen or subjective experience of gender. Based on this definition, school districts will be required to enforce single-sex participation in athletics in accordance with a student’s biological sex assigned at birth.

The bill also prohibits a school, interscholastic conference, or organization that regulates interscholastic athletics from knowingly permitting individuals of the male sex to participate on athletic teams or in athletic competitions designated only for participants of the female sex. Currently, this act conflicts with Ohio High School Athletic Association (“OHSAA”) policies which allow transgender students to participate in athletics in accordance with their preferred gender identity in certain limited circumstances.

If a student believes that they have been deprived of an athletic opportunity or otherwise suffered harm as a result of a school district, conference, or organization’s violation of the bill’s single-sex participation requirements, the student may file a private civil action for injunctive relief, damages, or other available relief against the school district, athletic conference, or organization which regulates student athletics.

Title IX Implications

The enactment of the Save Women’s Sports Act creates a conflict with a school district’s legal obligations to refrain from engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex (including gender identity) in its educational programs or activities as required by Title IX. However, given the private causes of action permitted by the bill, school districts may now be placed in a difficult position in deciding whether to comply with the Save Women’s Sports Act and face charges of discrimination in violation of Title IX, or comply with Title IX and its interpretation and face private civil action for violations of the Save Women’s Sports Act.

It is recommended school districts reach out to legal counsel when navigating these difficult issues.

Amid Global Unrest, U.S. Dept. of Ed. Reminds Schools of Obligation to Prohibit Discrimination Against Students From all Regions of the World

The U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued a Dear Colleague letter on November 7, 2023, reminding K-12 schools of their responsibility to ensure nondiscriminatory environments under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

With an alarming rise of antisemitic incidents and threats to Jewish, Israeli, Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian students on both college and K-12 campuses, K-12 schools must remain committed to providing all students a school environment free from discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, including shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics. The letter makes clear that schools are under a legal obligation to address prohibited discrimination against students and others on campus – including those who are or are perceived to be Jewish, Israeli, Muslim, Arab, or Palestinian.

Title VI’s protection from race, color, and national origin discrimination extends to students who experience discrimination, including harassment, based on their actual or perceived: (i) shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics; or (ii) citizenship or residency in a country with a dominant religion or distinct religious identity.

The letter explains that schools that receive federal financial assistance have a responsibility to address discrimination against Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Christian, and Buddhist students, or those of another religious group, when the discrimination involves racial, ethnic, or ancestral slurs or stereotypes; when the discrimination is based on a student’s skin color, physical features, or style of dress that reflects both ethnic and religious traditions; and when the discrimination is based on where a student came from or is perceived to have come from, including discrimination based on a student’s foreign accent; a student’s foreign name, including names commonly associated with particular shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics; or a student speaking a foreign language.

School districts that may have questions regarding their obligations under Title VI should reach out to their legal counsel for support. Additionally, OCR has developed a variety of resources, including a Dear Colleague Letter and Fact Sheet, to help inform school communities that receive federal financial assistance from the Department of their obligation to maintain educational environments free from discrimination. Resources are also available on the Shared Ancestry or Ethnic Characteristics page of OCR’s website.

 

U.S. Supreme Court Rules That Employer Must Show Substantial Increase in Cost if Denying a Religious Accommodation Request

In a unanimous decision in Groff v. Dejoy, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified Title VII’s undue hardship standard to mean that an employer that denies a religious accommodation must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not the long-standing “de minimus” standard used for nearly 50 years since the Court’s 1977 decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.

The facts of the case center around a USPS worker, Gerald Groff, whose religious beliefs prohibited him from working on Sundays. USPS redistributed Groff’s Sunday deliveries to other staff, but Groff received progressive discipline for failing to work on Sundays, and he eventually resigned. Groff sued USPS for violating Title VII by failing to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs, asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice without undue hardship on the conduct of USPS’s business. The District Court granted summary judgment to USPS and Third Circuit affirmed based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardison, which it construed to mean “that requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimus cost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.”

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held that showing more than a de minimus cost does not suffice to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. The Court further stated that an employer who fails to provide an accommodation has a defense only if the hardship is “undue,” and a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered “undue.” Specific to the case at hand, the Court determined that it would not be enough for an employer to conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift swapping, would also be necessary.

Of note, the Court’s decision leaves in place Title VII’s protections for seniority-based bidding systems. Specifically, the Court held “Title VII does not require an employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee’s religious practice.”

It is critical that when denying an employee’s religious accommodation request, school districts are prepared to show they are not just relying on the impact to other employees but are prepared to show that the cost of accommodating the request, as well as the impact on other employees, would be substantial on the conduct of the business.

ODE Issues Guidance on Budget Bill Changes to Instruction During Calamity Closures; Auditor Releases Levy Guidance

ODE Issues Guidance on Budget Bill Changes to Instruction During Calamity Closures

In years past (pre-COVID), public school districts were provided with the option of adopting a plan to make up hours lost due to calamity days - specifically, the equivalent of three days via “blizzard bags,” or online lessons. If a district used this option, it was required to adopt a plan before August 1, collaborate with the union regarding the plan, and finalize all lessons to be completed on or before November 1, among other requirements.

Ohio House Bill 33 (i.e., the Budget Bill) repealed the above process and, instead, created new requirements for making up hours of instruction lost due to calamity closure(s) in the form of a virtual education delivery model.

While HB 33 includes an August 1 deadline for school districts to adopt a plan to provide instruction through a virtual education delivery model, HB 33 is not effective until October 3, 2023, after the August 1 deadline. Given the lack of direction HB 33 provides school districts regarding a virtual option for make-up hours for this school year, ODE issued guidance yesterday encouraging school districts to adopt a plan no later than November 1, 2023. Seemingly, the August 1 deadline for the 2023-2024 school year will be extended until November 1.

Each plan may account for online instruction for a maximum number of hours that are equivalent to three school days.

The plan adopted by a school district is specifically required to contain each of the following:

  1. A statement that the school, to the extent possible, will provide for teacher-directed synchronous learning in which the teacher and students are interacting in real time on a virtual learning platform during the closure.

  2. The qualifying school's attendance requirements, including how the school will document participation in learning opportunities and how the school will reach out to students to ensure engagement during the closure.

  3. A description of how equitable access to quality instruction will be ensured, including how the school will address the needs of students with disabilities, English learners, and other vulnerable student populations.

  4. The process the school will use to notify staff, students, and parents that the school will be using online delivery of instruction.

  5. Information on contacting teachers by telephone, electronic mail, or a virtual learning platform during the closure.

  6. A description of how the school will meet the needs of staff and students regarding internet connectivity and technology for online delivery of instruction.

Similar to the former “blizzard bags” plan, this plan must include the written consent of the teachers’ union.

Please note that any school that uses an online learning school or blended learning model in accordance with sections 3302.41 and 3302.42 of the Ohio Revised Code is not permitted to adopt the above-described plan.

Auditor Releases Levy Guidance

Yesterday, the Auditor of State’s office (“AOS”) released highly anticipated levy guidance that includes information to support public school districts with levy and bond issue campaign compliance. The guidance document addresses a variety of topics of interest for board members, school officials, and administrators concerning what the AOS may deem permissible (or impermissible) campaign activities.

We will continue to provide you with additional information and updates regarding the AOS’s guidance and other developments related to HB 33, but if you have any immediate questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us directly.

Supreme Court Clarifies IDEA Exhaustion Requirement

The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a 9-0 decision in the case of Miguel Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, holding that exhaustion under the administrative procedures outlined in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is not always a prerequisite for seeking relief under other federal anti-discrimination laws. Specifically, the Court held that IDEA’s exhaustion requirement did not preclude a student from separately bringing action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for monetary damages – a remedy that is not available under IDEA.

This holding establishes that a party can file a federal action for remedies without going through the IDEA administrative process as long as those remedies are not remedies the IDEA provides

Former student Miguel Luna Perez, who is deaf, attended Sturgis Public Schools.  He was on an IEP that provided him classroom aides who translated his instruction into sign language. The District advanced him from grade to grade and noted that he was passing his courses.  Yet several months before his graduation, the District notified his parents that he was not on track to graduate with a regular diploma.  It was ultimately determined that Perez’s classroom aides were either unqualified or absent from the classroom for periods of several hours. It was alleged that the District misrepresented Perez’s educational progress by inflating his grades and promoting him each year, despite his lack of progress. Perez’s parents filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education, under the IDEA’s complaint process, alleging that the District had failed to provide Perez with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the IDEA.  Prior to the case going to an administrative hearing, the parties reached a settlement.  

After settling his complaint under the IDEA, Perez filed suit against the District in federal district court under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress. However, the District Court dismissed Perez’s suit, since Perez had not exhausted all the IDEA’s dispute resolution procedures because he had settled his case. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which governs Ohio, affirmed the dismissal based on prior precedent in the Circuit that required exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

The U.S. Supreme Court took the case, since there was a split among federal circuits in interpreting the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The Court explained that “relief” in the exhaustion requirement is synonymous with “remedy,” so that the exhaustion requirement does not apply “if the remedy a plaintiff seeks is not one IDEA provides.” The Court concluded that the exhaustion requirement does not apply because compensatory damages are not available under the IDEA.

This decision departs from prior case law and now allows a student and the student’s parents to proceed directly to court for monetary damages in cases which previously would have needed to go through the IDEA hearing process first.  We may very well see more parents choose to start their case in court, where they may obtain monetary damages, but then also proceed with the IDEA administrative process, where they can seek compensatory education, reimbursement for enrollment in private schools, reimbursement for private evaluations, or other IDEA-based remedies. 

U.S. Department of Education Issues Guidance on Behavior Support and Discipline of Students with Disabilities

Last week, the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR), and Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) issued numerous guidance documents on behavior support and discipline of students with disabilities.  The U.S. Secretary of Education said that these documents are meant to be resources and provide information on federal protections against discrimination for students with disabilities.  The Department also specifically noted and recognized the extraordinary challenges students, schools, and families have experienced based on the pandemic.

The guidance reminds public elementary and secondary schools of their obligations under Section 504 and the IDEA to provide the services, supports, interventions, strategies, and modifications to policies students with disabilities need to address any disability-based behavior, including behavior that could lead to discipline. The guidance explains that when schools issue discipline to students with disabilities, they must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner.

OCR and OSEP reiterate the expectation that schools must ensure they support students with disabilities (including specifically those with behavioral needs and mental health issues) and are mindful of the processes required to be completed before discipline can be meted out.  The guidance also discusses that restraint and seclusion procedures can constitute disability discrimination, and notes that such procedures are disproportionately used on students with disabilities.

The guidance also strongly encourages that schools utilize culturally and linguistically responsive multi-tiered system of supports (MTSS), a comprehensive prevention framework designed to improve developmental, social, emotional, academic, and behavioral outcomes using a continuum of evidence-based strategies and supports. 

It is important that administrators review the guidance documents to support compliance with ongoing legal requirements, and check current processes and procedures to support compliance with anti-discrimination laws.

ODE Helps to Address the Substitute Teacher Shortage

On June 24, 2022, Governor DeWine signed House Bill (“HB”) 583 in law to continue to provide flexibility for school districts to employ substitute teachers with relaxed educational qualifications through the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years. Like previous flexibility, HB 583 allows a public school district, JVS, ESC, STEM school and community or chartered nonpublic school to employ an individual as a substitute teacher according to the district’s or school’s own education requirements, as long as the individual also is deemed to be of good moral character and successfully completes a criminal records check.

The State Board will issue a nonrenewable temporary substitute teaching license to an individual who meets those requirements, even if the individual does not hold a post-secondary degree.

Unfortunately, the legislation does not allow ODE to issue the temporary substitute teaching credential until September 23, 2022, because HB 583 does not contain an emergency provision and therefore does not take effect until September 23. However, on July 21, 2022, ODE issued guidance indicating that it will accept applications for a one-year temporary non-bachelor’s substitute teaching license beginning August 1, 2022, to allow school districts to conditionally employ individuals who have an application pending for up to sixty (60) days from the date of application. This conditional employment allows school districts to employ these individuals starting August 1.

The process for employing these individuals will be as follows:

  1.  Applicants submit the temporary application August 1 or after for the 2022-2023 school year;

  2. Once the Department receives an application, the local school board may conditionally employ the person as a substitute teacher for a period of 60 days. To hire the individual, the employing superintendent must believe the individual’s application indicates the person is qualified to obtain the substitute teaching license; and

  3. On September 23, the Department will begin rapidly processing all pending applications to ensure they are processed within the 60-day conditional employment period. Please note the period of conditional employment will last for 60 days or until the licensure application has either been issued or declined, whichever comes first.

After September 23, 2022, the Department will resume processing 1-Year Temporary Non-Bachelor’s Substitute Teaching License applications in the normal fashion. 

U.S. Supreme Court Sides with Coach and On-Field, Post-Game Prayer

In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, holding that the free exercise and free speech clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.

In this case, a Washington school district football coach, Joseph Kennedy, had a personal practice of giving “thanks through prayer on the playing field” at the conclusion of each game. Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers after the players and coaches had shaken hands, by taking a knee at the 50-yard line and praying “quiet[ly]” for “approximately 30 seconds.”  Initially, Mr. Kennedy prayed on his own but over time, some players asked whether they could pray alongside him. Mr. Kennedy responded by saying, “This is a free country. You can do what you want.” The number of players who joined Mr. Kennedy eventually grew to include most of the team, at least after some games. Sometimes team members invited opposing players to join. Other times, Mr. Kennedy prayed alone. Eventually, Mr. Kennedy began incorporating short motivational speeches with his prayer when others were present. Separately, the team at times engaged in pregame or postgame prayers in the locker room. The Supreme Court noted that it seemed this practice was a “school tradition” that predated Mr. Kennedy’s tenure.  Mr. Kennedy explained that he “never told any student that it was important they participate in any religious activity” and said that he “never pressured or encouraged any student to join” his postgame midfield prayers.

This went on for many years, until an employee from another school commented positively on the practice to a Washington District principal.  The District then contacted Mr. Kennedy about “two problematic practices” - specifically, the “inspirational talk[s]” that included “overtly religious references” likely constituting “prayer” with the students “at midfield following the completion of . . . game[s]” and the fact that Mr. Kennedy had led “students and coaching staff in a prayer” in the locker-room tradition that “pre-dated [his] involvement with the program.”  The District explained to Mr. Kennedy that it sought to establish “clear parameters” “going forward,” and instructed Mr. Kennedy to avoid any motivational “talks with students” that “include[d] religious expression, including prayer,” and to avoid “suggest[ing], encourag[ing] (or discourag[ing]), or supervis[ing]” any prayers of students, which students remained free to “engage in.” The District also explained that any religious activity on Mr. Kennedy’s part must be “nondemonstrative (i.e., not outwardly discernible as religious activity)” if “students are also engaged in religious conduct” in order to “avoid the perception of endorsement.” 

Mr. Kennedy ended the locker-room prayers and the practice of incorporating religious references or prayer into his postgame motivational talks to his team on the field.  But because of his “sincerely-held religious beliefs,” he felt “compelled” to offer a “post-game personal prayer” of thanks at midfield. He asked the District to allow him to continue that “private religious expression” alone. He noted that, consistent with the District’s policy, he “neither requests, encourages, nor discourages students from participating in” these prayers, and emphasized that he sought only the opportunity to “wai[t] until the game is over and the players have left the field and then wal[k] to mid-field to say a short, private, personal prayer.” He said that it would be acceptable to him to wait to say his “prayer while the players were walking to the locker room” or “bus,” and then catch up with his team.

He also noted that the District policy prohibited him from “discourag[ing]” independent student decisions to pray.  Yet the District issued him another letter that forbade Mr. Kennedy from engaging in “any overt actions” that could “appea[r] to a reasonable observer to endorse . . . prayer . . . while he is on duty as a District-paid coach.” The District did so because it judged that anything less would lead it to violate the Establishment Clause.  After receiving that letter, Mr. Kennedy offered a brief prayer following the next game.  It was noted that, when he bowed his head at midfield, most of his players were engaged with singing the school fight song to the audience.  Though Mr. Kennedy was alone when he began to pray, players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he finished his prayer. This event spurred media coverage about the exchange between the District and Mr. Kennedy on this topic, and ultimately the District placed robocalls to parents to inform them that public access to the field was forbidden, it posted signs and made announcements at games saying the same thing, and it had the police secure the field in future games.

Before a game a few days later, the District sent another letter to Mr. Kennedy in which the District expressed appreciation for Mr. Kennedy’s efforts to comply with the District’s directives, including avoiding “on-the-job prayer with players in the . . . football program, both in the locker room prior to games as well as on the field immediately following games,” and also admitted that, during Mr. Kennedy’s recent postgame prayer, his students were otherwise engaged and not praying with him, and that his prayer was “fleeting.” Yet the District explained that a “reasonable observer” could think government endorsement of religion had occurred when a “District employee, on the field only by virtue of his employment with the District, still on duty” engaged in “overtly religious conduct.”  The District thus made clear that the only option it would offer Mr. Kennedy was to allow him to pray after a game in a “private location” behind closed doors and “not observable to students or the public.” Still after that evening’s game, Mr. Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line, where “no one joined him,” and bowed his head for a “brief, quiet prayer.”  And, again, after the final relevant football game of the season, Mr. Kennedy knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions.  While he was praying, other adults gathered around him on the field.

Shortly after the final game, the District placed Mr. Kennedy on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from “participat[ing], in any capacity, in . . . football program activities.”  In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action, the superintendent criticized Mr. Kennedy for engaging in “public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach” by offering a prayer following the games.  The letter did not allege that Mr. Kennedy performed these prayers with students, and it acknowledged that his prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities.  Additionally, the letter faulted Mr. Kennedy for not being willing to pray behind closed doors.  In a subsequent Q&A document provided to the public, the District admitted that it possessed “no evidence that students have been directly coerced to pray with Kennedy.”  The Q&A also acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy “ha[d] complied” with the District’s instruction to refrain from his “prior practices of leading players in a pre-game prayer in the locker room or leading players in a post-game prayer immediately following games.”  But the Q&A asserted that the District could not allow Mr. Kennedy to “engage in a public religious display” since otherwise, the District would “violat[e] the . . . Establishment Clause” because “reasonable . . . students and attendees” might perceive the “district [as] endors[ing] . . . religion.” While Mr. Kennedy received “uniformly positive evaluations” every other year of his coaching career, after the 2015 season ended in November, the District gave him a poor performance evaluation, which advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the grounds that he failed to follow district policy regarding religious expression and “failed to supervise student-athletes after games.” Mr. Kennedy did not return for the next season.

Mr. Kennedy sued the District in federal court, alleging that the District’s actions violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.  The District Court sided with the District, concluding that a “reasonable observer . . . would have seen him as . . . leading an orchestrated session of faith” and that if the District had not suspended him, the District might have violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Yet the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and held that Mr. Kennedy’s prayer was protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment and did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The Court found that Mr. Kennedy’s speech was private speech, not government speech.  When he prayed during the three football games at issue, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as a coach.  He did not speak pursuant to government policy nor was he seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. Further, the timing of the prayers also confirmed for the Court that this was private speech.  The prayers occurred during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters - everything from checking sports scores on their phones to greeting friends and family in the stands. The Court found that it did not matter that Mr. Kennedy’s prayers took place “within the office” environment - here, on the field of play; instead, what mattered was whether Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach, which the Court found that he did not.

The Court also found that Mr. Kennedy did not compel students to pray.  The Court noted that the District itself was not concerned at the time that Mr. Kennedy coerced, required, or asked any student to pray.   Instead, the Court found that Mr. Kennedy did not seek to direct any prayers to students or require anyone else to participate, and, therefore, no students were coerced to participate.

Finally, the Court addressed the District’s position that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed impermissibly coercive to students, as a matter of law.  The Court noted that an Establishment Clause violation does not automatically follow whenever a public school or other government entity “fail[s] to censor” private religious speech.  Nor does the Clause “compel the government to purge from the public sphere” anything an objective observer could reasonably infer endorses or “partakes of the religious.”  The Court noted that this would result in schools being required to fire teachers for praying quietly over their lunch, for wearing a yarmulke to school, or for offering a midday prayer during a break before practice. Ultimately, the Court explained that permitting private speech is not the same thing as coercing others to participate in it.

This case has significant implications for school districts and alters what was generally understood a responsibility to separate religious practice from government conduct under the Establishment Clause. It creates new and important factors to consider when addressing employee religious activity.  Please contact your legal counsel when such First Amendment issues arise.

U.S. Supreme Court Decides State Funds Must Go to Private Religious Schools Too

With mounting concerns regarding the separation of church and state in public schools, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on June 21, 2022, that the state of Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments to parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own violates the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.

The case of Carson v. Makin involves a tuition assistance program enacted for parents who live in school districts in the state of Maine that neither operate a secondary school of their own nor contract with a particular school in another district. Under that program, parents designate the secondary school they would like their child to attend, and the school district transmits payments to that school to help defray the costs of tuition; however, Maine has limited tuition assistance payments to “nonsectarian” schools.  Two families filed suit because their children attended religious schools in Maine that otherwise met the requirements for the tuition assistance program except for the fact that the schools were sectarian.  The parents alleged that the “nonsectarian” requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court rejected their constitutional claims and the First Circuit affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme Court took the case and held that the “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause.

Here, Maine offers its citizens a benefit: tuition assistance payments for any family whose school district does not provide a public secondary school, yet disqualifies certain private schools from public funding “solely because they are religious.” The Court held that a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause.  The Court found that a State’s anti-establishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise.  The Court noted that Maine’s decision to continue excluding religious schools from its tuition assistance program involved stricter separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires, and on the other end, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The Court did note that states need not subsidize private education, but once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious. 

Ohio Law Addresses Substitute Teacher Shortage

On June 24, 2022, Governor DeWine signed House Bill (“HB”) 583 into law. The bill extends a provision of Senate Bill 1 that took effect last October to continue to provide flexibility for school districts to employ substitute teachers with relaxed educational qualifications through the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years. Like previous flexibility, HB 583 allows a public school district, JVS, ESC, STEM school and community or chartered nonpublic school to employ an individual as a substitute teacher according to the district’s or school’s own education requirements, as long as the individual also is deemed to be of good moral character and successfully completes a criminal records check.

The State Board will issue a nonrenewable temporary substitute teaching license to an individual who meets those requirements, even if the individual does not hold a post-secondary degree. To continue to take advantage of this flexibility, boards must again take action to establish their own education requirements for the hiring of substitute teachers. It is advised to review current policy, potential job postings and/or job descriptions, as well as any other local requirements that may conflict with the relaxed qualifications for substitute teachers for the upcoming school years.

Notably, unlike previous legislation, HB 583 does not contain an emergency provision, so the effective date is not until after the 2022-2023 school year begins – i.e., effective September 22, 2022. It is important to be mindful of the effective date for the 2022-2023 school year if employing substitutes under the relaxed requirements.

Ohio House Bill 99 Authorizes Arming School Staff

Currently, Ohio law generally prohibits a person from being armed in a school safety zone, with the exception of state or federal law enforcement personnel who are authorized to carry deadly weapons, and security officers/staff with extensive peace officer training who are employed by a school board and authorized to carry while on duty.

However, on June 13, 2022, Governor DeWine signed into law Ohio House Bill 99, effective September 12, 2022, that expressly overrules the 2021 Ohio Supreme Court decision in Gabbard v. Madison Local School District Bd. of Education to allow a school employee who has written authorization from a school board to be voluntarily armed in a school safety zone, provided that:

  • the employee completes an initial 24-hour training program (a significant reduction to the previously required 700 hours of peace office training);

  • the employee submits to an annual criminal records check;

  • the school board notifies the public, by whatever means the school regularly communicates, that the board has authorized one or more staff members to go armed within its school district; and

  • the employee submits to eight requalification training hours on an annual basis. 

Boards of education are permitted, but not required, to require additional training.

House Bill 99 also expands the Ohio School Safety Center (OSSC) and creates a new OSSC Safety & Crisis DivisionThe new OSSC Safety & Crisis Division will be led by a chief mobile training officer who will oversee 16 new regional training officers working within the 16 established Ohio Department of Education school safety support team regions. This new team of 17 OSSC staff members will develop the required initial training curriculum, yearly requalifying curriculum, and optional additional training curriculum for those authorized by their school districts to carry a firearm on school grounds. Training modules will include scenario-based training, as well as instruction on mitigation techniques, communications, neutralization of potential threats and active shooters, accountability, reunification, psychology of critical incidents, de-escalation techniques, crisis intervention, trauma and first aid care, history/pattern of school shootings, tactics of responding to critical incidents, tactical live firearm training, and realistic urban training. More information regarding Governor DeWine’s school safety initiatives can be found here.

Ultimately, HB 99 does not require a board of education to arm school employees. This was emphasized in a recent letter from Governor DeWine to state school superintendents. Rather, HB 99 emphasizes that the decision to arm school staff is a local decision up to each individual school board. If a board is considering arming staff, it is advised to notify its liability insurance carrier, solicit feedback concerning the risks associated with this level of authorization, and consult with legal counsel regarding unintended consequences that may result in liability to the school district due to arming school staff.

Ohio Supreme Court Clarifies Strict Liability for Public Officials for Misappropriated Public Money

The case of State ex rel. Yost v. Burns, recently decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, clarified that a public official cannot be held strictly liable for the misappropriation of public money when neither the official nor any of the official’s subordinates collects or receives, and therefore does not control, the funds.

In that case, the treasurer of an Ohio community school pled guilty to embezzlement of funds from the community school.  The situation arose from an Audit Report that made a Finding for Recovery against the community school and the treasurer specifically, as well as three other individuals and one entity. 

Six years after the Audit Report was closed, the Ohio Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Robert Burns, who had served as the director of the community school at the time of the misappropriation by the treasurer.  While Mr. Burns was not named in the finding for recovery, the Attorney General later sought to collect the misappropriated funds from Mr. Burns based on the finding for recovery against the treasurer and others. The Attorney General maintained that Mr. Burns was responsible for approving budget expenditures through Ohio Department of Education’s accounting system, which, along with the approval of the treasurer, triggered the release of public funds from the ODE for deposit into the community school’s bank accounts.  Mr. Burns reported to the community school governing board in his role as director.  Mr. Burns had no authority to disburse public money from any of the school’s bank accounts, nor did he have any supervisory responsibilities over those accounts. Those duties belonged to the treasurer, who Mr. Burns did not supervise, manage, or have any authority over. 

By way of background, as public officials, certain school district employees are bound by R.C. 9.39, which states that “[a]ll public officials are liable for all public money received or collected by them or by their subordinates under color of office.” 

The Attorney General contended that in exercising this budget approval responsibility, Mr. Burns “collected” public money within the meaning of R.C. 9.39, and could therefore be held strictly liable for the findings for recovery made against the treasurer and others, despite the fact that Mr. Burns had no control over the funds.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a public employee cannot collect or receive public money, let alone be held strictly liable for the misappropriation of that money within the context of R.C. 9.39 without controlling it. Accordingly, it found that Mr. Burns could not be held strictly liable for the misappropriated public money from the community school, because the funds were never in his possession and he never exerted any control over them.  Even though the money could not have been received or collected without Mr. Burns requesting funds from ODE, the Court still found that Mr. Burns himself did not receive or collect those funds.

This holding limits the extension of strict liability to administrators who do not exert the requisite level of fiscal control over public funds.  Here, it was the director of a community school.  But a similar extension of strict liability, left unchecked, could have been made to public school district administrators with no fiscal control but who do come into contact with public funds.  The Supreme Court has likely prevented such a result.

Juneteenth a Required Paid Holiday for 11- and 12-Month Nonteaching School Employees

Last month, Governor DeWine signed into law Senate Bill 11, impacting the paid holidays required for eleven- and twelve-month regular nonteaching school employees, pursuant to section 3319.087 of the Revised Code. This recent change clarified prior law enacted last year, that provided Juneteenth as a paid holiday for only nine- and ten-month regular nonteaching employees (who likely do not work during June). 

Effective June 10, 2022, school districts are required to grant Juneteenth as a paid holiday for their regular nonteaching employees who are employed on an eleven- or twelve-month basis, so long as an employee accrues earnings on the next preceding and next following scheduled work days before and after Juneteenth, or where the employee was properly excused from attendance at work on either or both of those days.

School districts are not required to provide Juneteenth as a paid holiday for any other employees of the district.  Though, a school district may, at its discretion, grant Juneteenth as a paid holiday to other employees. Should that be the case, school districts should consider the appropriate method of doing so, which may include modifying board policy, entering into a memorandum of understanding, and/or amending individual employment contracts, depending on the circumstances.

ODE Implements New Transportation Monitoring System

Effective April 1, 2022, the Ohio Department of Education’s Office of Field Services and Transportation will have a new compliance monitoring system for school district pupil transportation services. This system is designed to allow monitoring and enforcement of transportation responsibilities as outlined in state law – specifically, the requirement to transport all eligible students, including those who attend private or community/charter schools.

With recent bus driver staffing shortages, it is critical that school districts understand the new monitoring process and their obligations related to pupil transportation to avoid any reduction in transportation funding.

As part of the new monitoring process, school districts are required to complete a list of assurances and submit it to the Office of Field Services and Transportation no later than August 1 prior to each school year. The new system also includes a formal complaint process for individuals – namely, parents or community or nonpublic schools – to report a school district(s) for non-compliance. The complaint process includes reporting schools for the following issues/concerns regarding non-compliance:

  • The school district is not providing transportation to those eligible K-8 community and/or nonpublic school students living less than a 30-minute drive from the school in which the student would attend if he/she were attending the public school district of residence.

  • The school district is not providing transportation for all eligible K-8 students who live more than two miles from the school they attend.

  • Special education transportation should be provided to any eligible student in preschool through grade 12. The school district is not providing transportation to students with disabilities in accordance with Ohio Administrative Code 3301-51-10.

  • The school district of residence is not providing transportation from the public high school to career technical education programs.

  • The school district is not providing transportation for the eligible community and/or nonpublic K-8 students each day the community and/or nonpublic schools are in session.

  • If a school district received the start and end times (bell schedule) from the community and/or nonpublic schools by April 1, it did not develop a transportation plan within 60 days of receiving the start and end times.

  • The school district is not able to deliver eligible students to their respective school buildings as outlined in law: no earlier than 30 minutes prior to the start of school; and pick up no later than 30 minutes after the school day ends.

  • An agreement has not been developed to provide another mode of transportation, such as mass transit systems, for K-8 students between the community or nonpublic schools and the school district.

  • If an eligible student enrolled after July 1, the school district did not develop a transportation plan within 14 business days of receiving a request for transportation services from the student’s parent or guardian.

  • According to Ohio Revised Code 3327.02, the district did not declare transportation of students impractical within 30 calendar days prior to the first day of instruction or within 14 days of enrollment.

  • The school district time schedule was adopted later than 10 days after the school year began.

Once a complaint is filed, the Office of Field Services and Transportation will reach out to the school district within three (3) business days and begin its investigation.

The investigation will be completed within 10 business days after the receiving the complaint and will focus on whether the district has been out of compliance for a consistent or prolonged period of time. “Prolonged” is defined as 10 consecutive school days of non-compliance; “consistent” is defined as 10 total school days of non-compliance in any given semester.

If there is a finding of non-compliance, the Office of Field Services and Transportation will submit to the Office of Budget and School Finance the number of days to be deducted from the district’s transportation funds in accordance with R.C. 3327.021. Any district found to be non-compliant may be required to undergo additional review by the Office of Field Services and Transportation.

Ohio Department of Health Updates K-12 Requirements for Reporting COVID-19 Cases

Effective March 10, 2022, the Ohio Department of Health rescinded the September 3, 2022, order that required certain reporting and notification of COVID-19 cases in K-12 schools to parents and to local health departments. K-12 schools are no longer required to maintain a reporting system for parents to report positive tests or cases; no longer required to notify parents or guardians of the existence of a case of COVID-19 among staff, students, and/or coaches; and no longer required to report such a case to the local health department (unless the test is done by the school, and the result is positive). As a result of this change, families no longer need to report positive cases of COVID-19 to their child’s school.

Though K-12 schools are no longer obligated to report positive COVID-19 cases, subject to the above exception, other Ohio Department of Health recommendations remain in effect regarding mitigation strategies like thoroughly cleaning and sanitizing shared materials, encouraging students to wash and sanitize their hands throughout the course of the school day, practicing social distancing, and vigilantly assessing members of the school community for symptoms of COVID-19 . ODH’s Mask to Stay/Test to Play recommendations remain in effect as well regarding recommended quarantine and isolation measures for district students.

Ohio House Bill 51 Allows Virtual Public Meetings Through June 30, 2022

On February 17, 2022, Governor DeWine signed House Bill (“HB”) 51 to allow a public school district board of education, among other public entities, to hold and attend meetings and conduct and attend hearings virtually, through June 30, 2022, effective immediately.

Authorization for virtual board meetings was first issued on March 9, 2020, via Ohio HB 197, during the period of emergency declared as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and was later extended through July 1, 2021, in accordance with Ohio HB 404. Since that time, some boards and other public entities have been looking for reauthorization to hold virtual meetings.

Effective February 17, 2022, HB 51 authorizes a board to hold and attend meetings and hearings by means of teleconference, video conference, or any other similar electronic technology. This aligns to prior authorizations for virtual board meetings/hearings.

Any resolution, rule or action taken pursuant to this emergency provision will have the same effect as if it had occurred during an open meeting. Board members who attend meetings or hearings by teleconference, video conference, or any other similar electronic technology, must be considered present as if attending in person, permitted to vote, and must be counted in determining whether a quorum of the board is present.

Boards are required to provide notice of virtual meetings or hearings at least twenty (24) hours in advance to allow individuals to determine the time, location, and the manner in which the meeting or hearing will be conducted, and are further required to provide the public with access to the meeting or hearing. (Recall also, that for special meetings, continuing law requires the purpose of the meeting to be timely noticed as well.) In doing so, school boards must ensure that the public is able to observe and hear each member’s discussion and deliberation. Public access to meetings may be provided via live-stream, internet, local radio, television, cable, or public channels, call-in information for a teleconference, or any other similar electronic technology.

If your board wishes to take advantage of the authorization to hold virtual meetings or hearings, the board should be careful to review board policy to determine whether current policy limits or prohibits virtual meetings or the authority of board members who attend virtually, and review policy regarding public participation to determine whether public comment can be accomplished in accordance with current policy. Some boards of education previously authorized virtual meetings through amended policy or resolution. It is advisable that boards revisit previous authorizations to determine whether they need to reauthorize authority to conduct virtual meetings and/or hearings and how public comment will (or will not) be achieved.

Gingo & Bair Law, LLC Welcomes Attorney Kyle Wheeler

We are pleased to announce Kyle Wheeler has joined the firm as our newest associate attorney.  A native to the area, Kyle grew up with a strong appreciation for public education, with a parent serving as a leader for Ohio public schools. After obtaining his undergraduate degree in business from The Ohio State University, graduating cum laude, Kyle earned his law degree from Cleveland Marshall College of Law, again graduating cum laude. Prior to joining Gingo & Bair Law, Kyle worked as an associate attorney for an Ohio-based law firm with a practice focused on education law.

Kyle advises public school districts and boards of education on a variety of education law matters, including labor and employment issues, student rights and discipline, human resources, public records law, special education, employee benefits, labor disputes, student privacy issues, and board governance. He has served on negotiations teams in bargaining for teachers and non-teaching staff, defended boards of education in labor arbitrations, termination proceedings, and before the State Employment Relations Board. In addition, Kyle has also litigated in state and federal court, as well as with state and federal administrative agencies.

Adding Kyle to the firm enhances our ability to broaden our scope of services while maintaining a customized approach to advocating for public school districts.  We are excited about this new endeavor, thrilled to work with Kyle, and look forward to expanding our vision of providing exceptional legal services in education.